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1. Introduction 
Bribery is the making of a payment or giving a reward to a person in office or a 
position of power to induce them to act in a corrupt manner for the benefit of the 
person making the payment or giving the reward.  Bribery as a facet of commercial 
fraud has come to the forefront of the international legal scene during the past 
decade.  Bribery attracts the application of a vast range of criminal and civil liability 
rules.  This paper is concerned with the UK law, the Bribery Act 2010 (“BA”), in 
dealing with bribery.  For the BA to apply, the person bribed must be performing a 
relevant function or activity, to which they are either in a position of trust, or expected 
to perform in good faith, or expected to perform impartially. 
One problem in curbing bribery in the corporate world has always been on 
how to hold the company as an entity liable for bribery.  This is because compared to 
a natural person who has a mind to carry out criminal acts the company being an 
artificial entity has no mind of its own.  To overcome this problem, the law developed 
a doctrine of attribution – where acts of senior officers of the company are attributed 
to the company.  In Tesco Supermarket Ltd v Nattrass ([1972] AC 153 at 170) Lord 
Reid said that the person acting for the company is an embodiment of the company, 
and his mind is the mind of the company, such that if it is a guilty mind then that guilt 
is the guilt of the company.  But the rules on corporate attribution depends on 
involvement of senior officers of the company, and are deficient where only junior 
officers are involved in the relevant criminal acts – the BA goes beyond attribution. 
In serving as an effective tool for curbing bribery in the corporate world, the 
BA seeks to reverse the rules on corporate attribution in relation to bribery with the 
effect that companies are likely to be guilty of bribery even when no senior officer 
commit bribery but where persons associated with the company commit bribery and 
companies had no adequate procedures to prevent bribery.  The effectiveness of the 
BA in curbing bribery is likely to be enhanced by its extra-territorial reach such that 
UK companies committing bribery overseas would face prosecution back in the UK. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides a brief legal 
framework of bribery law in the UK.  The third section explores the removal of the old 
distinction between public sector and private bribery under the BA.  The fourth 
section discusses business culture and the offence of failing to prevent bribery under 
the BA. The fifth section explores the robustness of the BA in curbing bribery by 
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moving away from attribution rules in the context of corporate crimes.  The sixth 
section looks at the extraterritorial reach of the BA.  The seventh section concludes. 
 
2. Brief legal framework of UK bribery law 
Bribery is a facet of commercial fraud.  As early as the 18th century, commercial 
fraud was active in British companies.  In the 17th century people started pooling 
shares instead of goods, and domestic companies emerged.  By the 18th century, 
fraud started entering such trading with promotion of exaggerating shares to attract 
investors to companies, leading to a stock market collapse.  This reached a climax in 
1720 when the share price of the South Sea Company collapsed; this event was 
known as the South Sea ‘Bubble’ because once it burst, there were no assets left.  
There came the Bubble Act 1720.  Thus, as early as 1720, commercial fraud was 
active.  But not until the BA, prior statutes did not effectively address commercial 
bribery and seemed to focus on public bribery and corruption in general. 
UK bribery laws have progressively reformed.  We trace this reform from the 
Public Bodies Corrupt Act 1889 – this confined bribery to the public sector, 
criminalising the soliciting or receiving of bribe by a person in public office.  The law 
moved to the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 – this enjoined private sector to 
bribery, making it an offence for agents to bribe people in public office.  When 
prosecution became difficult, the burden of proof was lightened by the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1916 – this created a rebuttable presumption that a person in public 
office who received a gift or money was corrupt.  On the international scene, the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions was adopted in 1997 and came into force in 1999, and was 
implemented in UK law under Part 12 (ss108-110) Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act 2001, which dealt with bribery committed outside the UK by public officials. 
Pressures to reform UK bribery laws were coming from within and outside the 
UK.  As from within the UK, a brief history of reforms of bribery law indicates that the 
BA began life with the Nolan report (Nolan, 1995).  One of the concerns in the Nolan 
report was that, public officials, on leaving office, were taking up positions in 
companies with which they had had official dealings.  Thus the Nolan report 
recommended reforms of the law on bribery.  In 1998 the Law Commission proposed 
legistaltive reform of bribery law (Law Commission, 1998).  As bribery is linked to 
corruption, the Government’s white paper published in 2000 was on corruption 
(White Paper, 2000).  The white paper having been subjected to much pre-legislative 
scrutiny, the matter was sent back to the Law Commission. The Law Commission 
consulted and then published its report in 2008 (Law Commission, 2008).  The draft 
Bribery Bill (Cm 7570) was put to Parliament on 25 March 2009, and the Bribery Bill 
received Royal Assent on 8 April 2010, becoming the Bribery Act 2010 (the “BA”). 
As to pressures to reform UK bribery law coming from outside the UK, this 
came in late when the UK was already committed to reform bribery law.  In 2005 the 
OECD Working Group, ignoring the Functional Equivalence approach, was unhappy 
with the UK legal framework, and stated that there was “a lack of clarity among the 
different legislative and regulatory instruments in place ... The current substantive 
law governing bribery in the UK is characterised by complexity and uncertainty” 
(OECD, 2005).  But it is well known that English law is peculiar in its blend of 
common law and equity and partial codification of various areas of law through 
statutes, such that the law on bribery could be spread across these sources.  To say 
that the English legal framework was uncertain and complex therefore went against 
the grain of the functional equivalence approach.  For OECD threshold, what is 
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important is that the objective standard of the Convention is met, though functional 
equivalence of different legal instruments or measures is not easily obtained (Pieth, 
2007, p. 54).  Nonetheless, as the UK was already committed to reforming its bribery 
law, these external pressures hastened the fruition of BA and in 2010 the BA was 
born.  The BA is the watermark of reform of bribery law in the UK. 
The BA does not define bribery but sections 1 and 2 provides cases showing 
bribery as an offence of offering or taking a financial reward or other advantage with 
a consequence of performing a relevant function or activity improperly.  The law 
places the performer in a position of trust to perform a function or activity in good 
faith and impartially and therefore treats it as bribery to reward or induce a breach of 
trust or lack of good faith or partiality.  The test of improper performance is what a 
reasonable person in the UK would expect from the performer of a function or 
activity, disregarding any foreign custom or practice unless required by a written 
applicable law (Bribery Act 2010, s 5).  In simple terms, a company subject to the 
BA, if it cannot get away with a bribe in the UK, it is unlikely to justify bribes abroad. 
By the BA, the UK government aimed at establishing a clear legal, regulatory 
and policy framework for action against foreign bribery (HM Government, 2010).  
The result of this was a law, whilst taking a criminal offence-led strategy, containing 
a regulatory dimension to it (Horder, 2013, 199).  The regulatory dimension is 
evident in the defence – proof that the company had adequate procedures designed 
to prevent bribery being committed on its behalf – which is concerned with 
measuring the adequacy of internal standards that might otherwise be disregarded. 
The law aims to remove the position where all business pay bribes in the 
course of competing for contracts, and in particular compete on the basis of who can 
pay the highest bribe.  If all businesses, including overseas competitors, were to 
offer the highest bribes they can, the cycle of corruption would be perpetuated.  The 
ideal position is for markets to operate efficiently and for UK businesses to compete 
without making additional payments (Ministry of Justice, 2010). 
The problem of bribery is a corrosive one and undermines faith in transparent 
markets as well as confidence in the rule of law.  The law on bribery should aim at 
protecting and enhancing free markets for business transactions.  Whilst the UK had 
been slow to reform its bribery laws in regard to foreign corrupt payments by UK 
companies and their agents, the BA is a sign of hope that some change may be 
occurring which may lead to a more fundamental cultural change in the practices of 
many UK companies (Tomasic, 2011, 12).  In taking a regulatory sanction approach 
to corporate bribery, the BA is likely to be an effective law not only for curbing 
bribery, but also for protecting and enhancing free markets for business transactions. 
 
3. Public sector versus private bribery 
The BA has changed the way companies might do business.  In the old laws in the 
UK, whilst acceptance of a bribe by a public official was a crime, acceptance of a 
bribe by a private actor was not a crime.  The BA makes no distinction between 
public and private bribery.  The removal of this distinction seems to be based on the 
perceived difficulty of distinguishing between the private and public bribery.  The Law 
Commission took the view that, ‘the fact that there is now so much more private 
sector provision of goods and services in the public interest, makes it hard to argue 
that no one should ever accept advantages in any form simply because what they do 
involves a public service dimension’ (Law Commission, 2008, para 3.216). 
Stuart Green argues that public and private bribery ought to be distinguished 
on grounds that they are qualitatively different, albeit maintaining both to be wrong.  
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Green argues that those who hold public office have duties that are qualitatively 
different from those held by employees of private firms (Green, 2013, pp. 55-60).  
Public officials represent and work on behalf of the public good.  When public official 
accept bribes, they undermine a process in which all their constituencies 
theoretically have an interest.  Private employees who accept bribes also violate a 
trust, but it is a trust owed to a private firm, to their superiors, colleagues, customers 
of shareholders.  Private company officials ordinarily have no obligation to the 
general public other than that specifically imposed on them by law. 
Peter Alldridge also underscores that there is something qualitatively different 
about pubic bribery and private bribery (Alldridge, 2002, p. 267).  The problem with 
bribery derives not from a breach of trust, but rather from deleterious effects of 
corruption on the proper functioning of governments and markets.  He argues, 
bribery in the private sphere distorts the operation of a legitimate market (prevents 
competition to the detriment of consumers), whereas bribery in the public sphere 
creates a market in things that should never be sold (services of judges or civil 
servants). 
But the harmful effects of private bribery, especially in development projects, 
should not be underestimated.  Indira Carr illustrates how the private sector is 
presented with ample opportunity for engaging in bribery in development projects 
from the stage of inception to completion.  Carr notes that, through bribes, it is 
common for the private sector to influence public decision-making, and drive the 
choice of projects based on bribe rewards as opposed to the needs of the public.  
For example, a state with bountiful rainfall and a good irrigation system may decide 
to propose a project for the building of a dam, as opposed to funding for a 
vaccination programme to eradicate the high incidence of tuberculosis and other 
childhood diseases, if the rewards from the construction industry are far greater than 
that offered or promised by the pharmaceutical industry (Carr, 2013, p. 136). 
Whatever the merits of distinguishing between public and private sector 
bribery, the BA criminalises both.  Effective curbing of bribery calls for criminalising 
both the supply and receipt of bribes in both public and private sectors.  The removal 
of public versus private sector bribery distinction is likely to put pressure on 
companies to change their business cultures (see discussion in the next section). 
 
4. Business culture and the offence of failure to prevent bribery 
 
In a typical international business transaction, bribery takes the form of a company 
making a payment to a government official so that the latter would make a decision 
in the company’s interests rather than in the public interest.  In some countries a 
distinction is drawn between ‘bribes’ and ‘facilitation payments.’  The distinction 
between bribes and facilitation payments is very thin and it is difficult to see how the 
latter can be justified as a legal payment.  Yet, the OECD Convention in its 
Commentaries states that “small ‘facilitation’ payments do not constitute payments 
made ‘to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage’ within the meaning 
of paragraph 1 and, accordingly, are also not an offence” (OECD, 2011). In English 
law, a reward that is so small as not to be considered a reward at all is not bribery.  
In the Bodmin Case, Willes J mentioned how he had been required to swear that he 
would not take any gift from a man who had a plea pending unless it was “meat or 
drink, and that of small value” ([1869] 1 O’M & H 121).  Whilst a small value free 
lunch is not bribery, ‘facilitation payments’ is likely to be bribery under English law. 
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British companies are subject to the BA even when they operate abroad. The 
well-known English novel may well remind British companies of the aspired ethics: 
“We’ve got to have rules and obey them.  After all, we’re not savages.  We’re 
English, and the English are best at everything” (Golding, 1954).  If British 
companies doing business abroad should avoid falling foul of the BA, they have got 
to refrain from conforming to foreign local business cultures of making facilitation 
payments.  The problem with facilitation payments is it distorts competition in the 
markets.  Approaching the problem from a business law perspective than a criminal 
law focus, section 7 of the BA strikes a balance between criminalising and regulating 
such practices by creating an offence of a company’s failure to prevent bribery. 
It is a challenging corporate world for British companies doing business 
abroad.  In the study by Weber and Getz (2004, p. 697), the authors observe a number of 
challenges.  First, petty bribes are often demanded by low to mid-level civil servants to 
complete their job to supplement income – called grease payment.  Second, more 
complex bureaucracy also facilitates bribes as there are unclear lines of 
accountability, high levels of discretion and little transparency – bribery is used if 
bureaucracy is too complex to navigate through legitimate channels.  Third, this 
culture, economically, has a distortionary effects and there is an opportunity cost as 
the bribe payment is not put to productive use.  Fourth, the economic consequences 
of bribery are devastating to business seeking to compete legally in developing 
markets.  British companies must change these cultures or risk falling foul of the BA.  
As to grease payments, they are pure bribes and cannot be justified under the 
common law de minimis rule on bribes.  In Woodward v Maltby ([1959] VR 794) the 
books of matches given to electors by an election candidate were found to of small 
value to constitute a bribe.  Applying a de minimis rule, a gift is not a bribe if it is of 
such a small value that in itself it cannot induce favour from the recipient to the giver. 
Grease payments are favour payments without which the recipient will not do 
their job and therefore fall outside the de minimis rule.  Grease payments are 
rewards for doing the job one is under duty to do, and such rewards constitute a 
bribe in the wider sense of corruption.  It was said in R v Leslie Charles Parker 
([1986] 82 Cr App R 69) where a councillor received a reward after granting planning 
permission to a firm, that he had received a bribe, for the offence lies not in showing 
favour to the application but in accepting a reward for doing so.  Grease payments 
are bribes under the BA, as they reward or induce improper performance. 
Section 1 of the BA details the offence of bribing another person, known as 
‘active bribery.’  This prevents a person – either directly or through an agent – from 
offering, promising, or giving an advantage to another (Bribery Act 2010, s 1(2)(a)).  
A simple offer, promise or indirect payments received from third parties (Bribery Act 
2010, s 1(2)(a)), completes the offence and gifts of a financial nature or otherwise 
are included within the mandate of the provision and not limited to payments of 
money (Bribery Act 2010, ss 4 and 5).  The crucial requirement is that the party 
receiving the payment intends the advantage so proffered to induce the recipient to 
improperly perform an act or to reward the recipient for having done so (Bribery Act 
2010, s 2(b)(i)).  On the other hand, section 2 of the BA details the offence of passive 
bribery, where the perpetrator requests or agrees to receive a bribe.  Receipt of the 
bribe is not required; merely asking to receive it is sufficient (Bribery Act 2010, s 
2(3)(a)).  The bribe does not need to be monetary (Bribery Act 2010, s 2(3)(a)). 
In order to be liable for bribery under the BA, the test is whether a reasonable 
person in the UK thought it a bribe.  For example, it is likely that a reasonable person 
in the UK would think it bribery for a pharmaceutical company to pay doctors who 
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prescribe its products to patients.  In 2012, in the USA, a British pharmaceutical 
company, GlaxoSmithKline, settled to pay $3 billons in a case where the prosecutors 
said the company had tried to win over doctors by paying for trips to Jamaica and 
Bermuda (Thomas and Schmidt, 2012). 
Section 6 of the BA creates an offence of bribing a foreign official.  Closely 
linked to the definition in the OECD Convention (Art 1(4)(a)), a foreign public official 
is defined as one who holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any 
kind of a country or territory outside the UK, exercising a pubic function or is in an 
official or agent of a public international organisation (Bribery Act 2010, s 6(5)).  A 
public international organisation is defined as an organisation whose members 
include territories countries or territories, governments of countries or territories, 
other public organisations of a mixture of any of the above (Bribery Act 2010, s 6(6)).  
This offence has no jurisdictional limit (Ministry of Justice, 2010, para 22). 
Hospitality of free lunch to public official is not an offence unless intended to 
influence the foreign public official in his or her official capacity.  Thus, if what is 
provided is reasonable, proportionate and done in good faith, it is difficult to see how 
the offence can be triggered (Monteith, 2011, p. 112).  The Ministry of Justice 
explains that ‘bona fide hospitality … is recognised as an established and important 
part of doing business and it is not the intention of the Act to criminalise such 
behaviour’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010, para 46).  In Parliament, the UK government’s 
position was, ‘corporate hospitality is an accepted part of modern business practice 
and the government is not seeking to penalise expenditure on corporate hospitality 
for legitimate purposes.  But lavish corporate hospitality can be a bribe … where it 
was … intended the recipient to be influenced to act improperly’ (Tunnicliffe, 2010). 
The key provision of the BA in regard to companies is section 7, which 
creates an offence of failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery.  This 
broad provision creates a separate strict liability criminal offence for a company or 
other entity subject to this section.  A relevant commercial organisation (C) is guilty 
of an offence under this section if a person (A) associated with the relevant 
commercial organisation bribes another (B).  A relevant commercial organisation 
includes a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the UK and which 
carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere), or a partnership which is formed 
under the law of any part of the UK and which carries on a business (whether there 
or elsewhere) (Bribery Act 2010, s 7(5)).  This is applicable to any other body 
corporate (wherever incorporated), which carries on a business, or part of a 
business, in any part of the UK, or any other partnership (wherever formed) which 
carries on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the UK (Bribery Act 2010, 
s 7(5)(b) and (d)). 
Section 7(2) contains the ‘adequate procedures defence’, the only defence to 
corporate liability.  It is a defence where C had in place adequate procedures, 
designed to prevent persons associated with C from committing bribery.  With the 
establishment of this strict liability provision, which requires no intent or knowledge, 
there is no need to establish the controlling mind of a legal entity (see section 5 
below).  The BA cuts across the need to identify the controlling mind to find a 
company guilty.  Section 7 simply and only deals with failure to prevent bribery.  If 
bribery has occurred, the BA is concerned with (a) is the person an employee of the 
company, and (b) has the company failed to prevent that person committing bribery. 
Business criminal liability is necessary as most serious bribery is committed in 
a business environment and to the benefit of business (Monteith, 2011, p. 112).  The 
BA does not directly create an offence of not having an anti-bribery policy, but rather 
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it subtly deals with business integrity by creating an offence of failure to prevent 
bribery (section 7).  The effect of the defence of having ‘adequate procedures,’ is an 
important aspect of the BA and provides incentives to businesses to do something to 
prevent bribery.  The BA does not define what adequate measure for the defence is, 
but section 9 empowers the Secretary of State to provide guidance.  The BA, by the 
defence given to commercial organisations, is likely to achieve greater success than 
the normal deterrent of criminal law that mostly depends on enforcement.  This may 
be a gentle approach, but it is far better than using criminal law to its full extent – 
many of the larger companies already have well-developed codes in place as part of 
their corporate social responsibility, and should be able to incorporate anti-bribery 
policies and procedures with ease (Carr, 2013, p. 156). 
 
5. Beyond merely attributing crimes to companies 
The importance of holding companies liable for crimes resulting from their activities 
was well articulated by Turner J in R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd, as 
follows: 
 
Since the nineteenth century there has been a huge increase in the numbers 
and activities of corporations whether nationalised, municipal or commercial, 
which enter the private lives of all or most of “men and subjects” in a diversity 
of ways. A clear case can be made for imputing to such corporations social 
duties including the duty not to offend all relevant parts of the criminal law 
([1990] 93 Cr App R 72 at 83 per Turner J). 
 
In the case of bribery, the BA imputes to companies a duty not to offend criminal law.  
But first we examine the nature of companies.  The company having a legal 
personality separate from its shareholders and managers, yet being an artificial 
person, has often caused difficulties in finding the company directly liable for criminal 
acts.  English law treats a company as a legal person or entity in its own right and 
not as an aggregate of shareholders.  Incorporation gives the company legal 
personality, separate from its members, with the result that a company may own 
property, sue and be sued in its own corporate name (Lowry and Reisberg, 2009, p. 
31).  It was said in Solomon v Salomon, that: 
 
The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to 
the memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business 
is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, 
and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of 
the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members 
liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided 
by the Act ([1897] AC 22 at 51 per Lord MacNaghten). 
 
In the context of crimes, the premise of separate legal personality is that the entity 
cannot, ordinarily, be liable for crimes of its members and equally the converse.  
Moreover, ordinarily, common law and statutory criminal offences require proof of a 
criminal mind, yet it is difficult to show a criminal mind of a company, for the artificial 
person has no mind of its own as do the natural person.  One way the law has dealt 
with this is to create regulatory offences that attract strict liability without requiring 
proof of a criminal mind.  For example, the company commits a regulatory offence, if 
it fails to comply with the order of the Secretary of State to change its name 
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(Companies Act 2006, ss 67-68 and 75-76); or if it fails to comply with the 
requirement to keep a register of members available for inspection (Companies Act 
2006, s 114). 
But unlike regulatory offences, common law and statutory criminal offences 
requires a finding of mens rea – a criminal mind – which is difficult for an artificial 
person who does not have a mind of their own.  The law found a way around this by 
the doctrine of identification or attribution.  In Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic 
Petroleum Co Ltd, in finding actual company liability based on the acts of the 
company’s management, Lord Haldane attributed to the company the acts of the 
person “who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and 
centre of the personality of the corporation” ([1915] AC 705 at 713.  In Tesco 
Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass, the House of Lords did approve the approach of 
attribution in dealing with liability of companies, and stated both the problem and the 
solution as follows: 
 
A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent 
and he has hands to carry out his intentions.  A corporation has none of these: it 
must act through living persons, though not always one or the same person.  
Then the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company.  He is acting 
as the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company 
… He is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks 
through the persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind 
is the mind of the company.  If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the 
company ([1972] AC 153 at 170 per Lord Reid). 
 
Prior to the BA, it would have required applying attribution rules to find that the 
company has committed a bribe.  In Bolton Engineering v Graham, Denning LJ said 
that ‘the state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is 
treated by the law as such’ ([1957] 1 QB 159 at 172 per Lord Denning).  To apply 
attribution rules to bribes, the personnel with whom the company is identified would 
only include those at the centre of corporate power – the board of directors, the 
managing director and perhaps other senior personnel who carry out the functions of 
management and speak and act as the company.  As bribery generally happens in 
the lower hierarchy of corporations or institutions, relying on attribution for corporate 
crimes poses considerable difficulties (Yeoh, 2012, p. 43).  The BA goes beyond 
attribution rules to avoid their limitations. 
Ordinarily, the rules of attribution are meant to make the company criminally 
liable for the acts of its senior managers.  The limitations of these rules lie in 
requiring an identification of a human being at a senior level of company 
management who has committed a crime.  For example, in R v P & O European 
Ferries (Dover) Ltd ([1990] 93 CR App R 72) where a catastrophe befell the vessel 
Herald of Free Enterprise in Zeebrugge harbour with the result, inter alia, of loss of 
life, the criminal liability against the company failed because the prosecution was 
unable to identify one senior individual who had the necessary degree of mens rea 
for manslaughter.  The focus on the personnel within the company rather than on the 
activities of the company makes it difficult to secure conviction of the company. 
To resolve the difficulties resulting from focusing on senior managers rather 
than company activities, especially in cases where the activities of company have 
caused death, came into force the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act 2007.  Under section 1 of the 2007 Act, the company can be found guilty of a 
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relevant crime “if the way in which its activities are managed or organised by its 
senior management is a substantial element in the breach.”  But the 2007 Act still 
relies on rules of attribution – section 4 of the Act refers to senior participants, which 
implies not necessarily only those at the very top of the managerial hierarchy 
(Kershaw, 2012, p. 167).  But applying attribution rules even under the 2007 Act is 
not easy, and conviction is still rare – only one case between 2007 and 2013 where 
the facts of the case in a one man company suggests that it is not easy even at 
common law to obtain a conviction (R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd [2011] 
All ER (D) 100). 
Relying on such attribution rules creates difficulties where the breach is wholly 
a result of activities managed by the company’s junior management.  In curbing 
bribery, the BA goes beyond such attribution rules and makes the company liable for 
the criminal acts of any associated person resulting from criminal risks the company 
could have prevented.  The liability arises only if the associated person was 
intending to obtain a business advantage for the company (Davies and Worthington, 
2012, p. 206).  The associated person is a wider notion than senior management, for 
this includes junior management, employees at any level, or any agent of the 
company.  Moving away from attribution rules that focuses on acts of individuals, the 
BA focuses on the quality of business systems – their robustness to address risks of 
bribery and to prevent such crimes. 
 
6. Extraterritorial scope and application of the bribery law 
As the international community is determined criminalise bribery, the UK cannot 
afford to remain disinterested in the face of these international efforts.  In the former 
times, if a company or an individual in England needed to bribe overseas officials in 
order to secure business, then that was viewed by English law with total disinterest 
(Alldridge, 2002, p. 271).  This lack of interest has since changed with the BA.  The 
extraterritorial reach of the BA is twofold: first, companies ‘carrying on a business or 
part of a business’ in the UK commit a section 7 offence if persons associated with 
them and acting for their benefit commits bribery abroad; and second, companies 
connected with the UK by having been incorporated in the UK (Bribery Act 2010, s 
12(4)(h)) commit a section 1, 2 or 6 offence if they commit bribery abroad. This 
tightening of UK bribery law should not create enormous difficulties to British 
companies abroad in securing business contracts, for all major multinational 
companies, mostly from the USA, are likely to be on the same footing – subject to 
either domestic ant-bribery laws or OECD anti-bribery convention.  This should 
create a combined effort against business cultures that promote bribery, and create 
a level playing field for honest dealings and competition in international business. 
Apart from the BA’s extraterritorial reach, regulators around the world are 
actively seeking to reverse bribery cultures, and British companies are among the 
culprits.  In 2012, in the USA, the British pharmaceutical firm GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
agreed to plead guilty to criminal charges and pay $3 billion in fines for corruptly 
promoting its antidepressants by paying doctors for trips as well as spa treatments 
and hunting excursions (Thomas and Schmidt, 2012).  In 2013, in China, GSK was 
accused of bribing doctors with cash and sexual favours in return for prescribing its 
drugs, and the investigator in China found that bribery is a core part of the activities 
of GSK in China (Neate, 2013).  In 2013, in the USA, GSK announced that they will 
no longer pay doctors to promote its products as it attempts to modernize at a 
difficult time of the company (Monaghan, 2013).  This change in culture by GSK is 
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exactly what the BA envisions, and British companies operating abroad have to 
change their business culture or risk facing the BA’s extraterritorial reach. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has observed that the problem of bribery is a corrosive one and 
undermines faith in transparent markets as well as confidence in the rule of law.  It 
has argued that the law on bribery should aim at protecting and enhancing free 
markets for business transactions.  Most of the bribes committed are traced in the 
activities of companies.  Yet, holding companies liable for crimes has always caused 
difficulties given that the artificial legal entity lacks the criminal mind of its own.  
Attribution rules that impute the crimes of senior personnel to the company have not 
proven effective in imposing criminal liability on companies.  Tracing the reform of 
bribery laws in the UK, examining the deficiency of previous laws, this paper has 
argued that the effectiveness of the BA in curbing bribery lies in its regulatory 
approach that moves from focusing on the guilty of personnel to focusing on the 
activities of the company. 
This paper has examined the BA from three of its key features.  First, the BA 
removes the distinction between public and private sector bribery.  Differentiating 
between public and private sector bribery fuels the forbearance of practices such as 
‘facilitation payments’ or ‘grease payments’, which are now likely to fall foul of bribery 
under the BA.  But hospitality to a public official by way of say corporate free lunch 
that is proportionate and done in good faith is unlikely to trigger bribery offence under 
the BA.   Second, the BA creates a strict liability offence of failing to prevent bribery, 
but seasoned with a defence of ‘adequate procedures’, which defence provides 
incentives to companies to do something to prevent bribery.  In the regulatory 
application of this offence, the BA cuts across the need to identify the controlling 
mind to find the company guilty, and simply deals with failure to prevent bribery 
regardless of who within the company is culpable.  Third, the BA has an 
extraterritorial application.  With efforts of regulators around the world, by its 
extraterritorial reach, the BA is likely to lead to a more fundamental cultural change 
in the practices of many British companies doing business abroad, leading to 
transparent and competitive markets. 
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